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Abstract
This paper studies the impact of artificial noise (AN) on the secrecy performance of a target cell
in multi-cell cellular networks. Although AN turns out to be an efficient approach for securing a point-
to-point/single cell confidential transmission, it would increase the inter-cell interference in a multi-cell
cellular network, which may degrade the network reliability and secrecy performance. For analyzing
the average secrecy performance of the target cell which is of significant interest, we employ a hybrid
cellular deployment model, where the target cell is a circle of fixed size and the base stations (BSs)
outside the target cell are modeled as a homogeneous Poisson point process (PPP). We investigate
the impact of AN on the reliability and security of users in the target cell in the presence of pilot
contamination using a stochastic geometry approach. The analytical results of the average connection
outage and the secrecy outage of its cellular user (CU) in the target cell are given, which facilitates the
evaluation of the average secrecy throughput of a randomly chosen CU in the target cell. It shows that
with an optimized power allocation between the desired signals and AN, the AN scheme is an efficient
solution for securing the communications in a multi-cell cellular network.
Index Terms
Physical layer security, artificial noise, cellular network, pilot contamination, stochastic geometry,
secrecy throughput
I. INTRODUCTION
Following the pioneering work in [1], the study on security issue at the physical layer of a
communication system has received increasingly attention, especially in wireless communications
systems [2]-[21]. In recent years, multiple-input multiple-output (MIMO) technique has shown to
be an effective approach to enhance physical layer security (see [2] and the references therein.).
Various secrecy signal design schemes have been proposed to increase the secrecy rate, which is
used to measure the capability of a perfectly secured signal transmission from an information-
theoretic perspective. In particular, artificial noise (AN) assisted multiple-antenna transmission is
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2a popular secrecy scheme, which was first proposed in [3]. The basic idea of the AN scheme is
to transmit no-information-bearing random signals along with confidential signals to confuse
potential eavesdroppers via utilizing extra spatial degrees of freedom provided by multiple
antennas. To avoid interfering with the intended legitimate receiver, the AN signal needs to be
transmitted in the null space of the legitimate channel [4]. Since the channel state information
(CSI) of the eavesdropper is very difficult to be obtained in practice, AN has to be spatial-
isotropically broadcasted such that it can cover all potential eavesdroppers. Without requiring
the availability of eavedroppers’s CSI, it has been widely investigated by a considerable body
of literature [5]-[10] and has also been extended to cooperative relaying networks [11]-[14]. For
example, the achievable ergodic secrecy rate and secrecy throughput were optimized in fast and
slow fading multiple-input single-output (MISO) channels, respectively [5], [6]. The AN scheme
was also investigated in MIMO channel in [7] and a training and feedback based AN scheme was
proposed in [8]. The performance of AN scheme under a randomly distributed eavesdroppers
scenario was investigated in [9], [10]. Cooperative jamming was proposed and optimized in [11],
[12], and was generalized to hybrid jamming schemes in [13], [14] and uncoordinated jamming
schemes in [15].
However, in all the above works, the focus was to secure a point-to-point or a single cell
wireless transmission, i.e., a single pair of transmitter and legitimate destination is considered,
thus spatial-isotropically AN would not be an issue. Nevertheless, it will not be the case when
there are multiple pairs of transmitter and legitimate receiver. Due to the broadcast nature of
wireless medium, spatial-isotropically AN becomes an interference to other concurrent trans-
missions. Particularly, for downlink transmissions in a multi-cell cellular network with universal
frequency reuse, inter-cell cochannel interference becomes a critical impairment to the reliability
of wireless links. If spatial-isotropically AN is applied at the BSs to provide secrecy, additional
inter-cell interferences caused by AN will pervade over the cells, which may further deteriorate
the network performance. In this case, the application of AN scheme in cellular networks would
be questionable.
On the other hand, AN design/optimization requires the prior knowledge of the CSI of the
legitimate receivers, which should be obtained via pilot training and channel estimation in
practice. For maintaining the bandwidth efficiency, non-orthogonal pilots usually are utilized
3in different cells. However, this non-orthogonal nature would cause pilot contamination [23],
which makes the CSI estimation imperfect. Imperfect legitimate CSI would result in a so-called
AN leakage problem, i.e., AN will not be aligned perfectly in the null-space of the legitimate
channel so that the intended destination will be disturbed, which will also bring a significant
impact on the performances of the cellular users (CUs).
Therefore, considering the problems mentioned above, the performance of the AN assisted
secrecy scheme in a multi-cell cellular network should be evaluated carefully, especially for the
impact of AN transmission on the achievable secrecy performance of CUs.
A. Related Works
In the literature, there are several works that studied the physical layer security from a network
perspective instead of a point-to-point communication. A framework of stochastic geometry has
been utilized to model the distribution randomness of the users, where both transmitters and
receivers are distributed as PPPs. In [16], [17], single- and multi-antenna secrecy transmissions
in an ad hoc network have been investigated. In [17], AN is transmitted along with confidential
signal via either sectoring or beamforming. Secrecy outage and secrecy throughput performances
are evaluated and optimized. However, perfect CSI has been assumed and pilot contamination
problem has not been taken into consideration. Moreover, it is assumed that each transmit-receiver
pair over the whole network has a fixed uniform distance, which is not the case in a cellular
network. In [18], the secrecy performance of AN assisted transmission with a secrecy protected
zone has been evaluated in a random network. However, it is a point-to-point communication with
only a single pair of secure transceiver. In [19], the authors evaluated the achievable secrecy rate
of downlink transmissions in cellular networks. They only considered the single-antenna BS case,
ignoring both the small-scale fading and inter-cell interference. The work has been extended in
[20], where the average secrecy rate of a multiuser downlink transmission via regularized channel
inversion (RCI) precoding was investigated. A very recent work [21] provides a unified secrecy
performance analysis to multi-cell MISO downlinks considering the CSI imperfection. In [22],
the authors have extended the investigation to massive MIMO downlink systems. However, both
the analysis in [21] and [22] do not take into account the random spatial distribution of BSs and
CUs, which is the major deployment manner of the current cellular networks.
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Fig. 1. Hybrid model for a multi-cell cellular network. There is a target cell of a fixed size Rc. BSs outside the target
cell are distributed according to a PPP spatial model. The region inside the dash circle is the interference-exclusive region.
An upper bound of the inter-cell interference received at the target user is the aggregate interference from BSs outside the
interference-exclusive region assuming they are PPP distributed over the whole region outside the dash circle.
B. Main Contributions
In this paper, taking the AN leakage caused by pilot contamination into consideration, we
investigate the impact of additional inter-cell interferences caused by AN transmission on the
reliability and secrecy of a CU under a stochastic geometry framework [24], [25]. Different from
traditional studies under the stochastic geometry framework where all the BSs over the network
are homogeneously distributed and the network-wide performances are investigated for the entire
system, we take a cell-specific perspective where our focus is put on the performance of CUs in
a target cell. This is because in many applications when cellular networks have been built out,
cellular providers always wonder the performance of some given cells by adding additional BSs
in the network.
Motivated by this, in the paper, we consider a hybrid (stochastic) cellular deployment model,
where a target cell we are interested in has a fixed and known shape and size, and the positions of
BSs outside the target cell, CUs, and eavesdroppers are all modeled as independent Poisson point
processes (PPPs)1. Specially, we assume here that the target cell is a circle with a fixed radius
Rc. Fig. 1 depicts the cellular network deployment. For protecting the confidential information
from wiretapping, each BS over the whole network transmits confidential information and AN
1 The cell-specific perspective has been also proposed in [26], and a hybrid stochastic model is also adopted in [27], [28]. In
this work, our model is slightly different from [26] but have a similar idea.
5simultaneously. We analyze the effect of AN transmission in such a network on the connection
outage, secrecy outage and average secrecy throughput of a CU in the target cell. Our goal is
to evaluate whether the AN scheme is still valid in a cellular network. The main contributions
of the paper are summarized as follows.
1) Considering the effect of pilot contamination, we provide connection outage and secrecy
outage analysis of a CU in the target cell affected by the AN assisted secure transmission
scheme in the random cellular network.
2) We analyze the achievable average secrecy throughput of a CU in the target cell by
considering the random distribution of CUs and user scheduling.
3) We show that AN is still a promising solution for enhancing the secrecy of users in
cellular networks. For maximizing the secrecy performance, the power allocation between
the confidential information and AN should be optimized carefully to tradeoff between
reliability and secrecy.
We note that a relative analysis has been provided in [17] for an ad hoc network. However,
compared with the work in [17], the important differences are summarized as follows.
1) The analysis models in our work and [17] are totally different. We adopt the hybrid
stochastic model where all BSs and CUs outside the target cell are randomly distributed.
But in [17], a bipolar network model has been adopted, where every transmitter-receiver
pair has a fixed distance.
2) We have considered the effect of the pilot contamination and the resulted CSI imperfection
and AN leakage problems, while perfect CSI has been assumed in [17].
3) We concentrate on analyzing the secrecy performance of CUs in some specific cell, but
the work in [17] analyzes the average secrecy performance of the whole network.
C. Organization and Notations
Notation: (.)H and ||.||F denote the conjugate transpose and Frobenius norm. IN denotes
N × N identity matrix. x ∼ CN (Λ,∆) denotes the circular symmetric complex Gaussian
vector with mean vector Λ and variance ∆, y ∼ Gamma (k, θ) denotes that y that is gamma-
distributed with shape k and scale θ, y ∼ exp(b) denotes that y is an exponential variate whose
mean is b. The factorial of a non-negative integer n, denoted by n! and
(
N
k
)
= N !
k!(N−k)!
, E is
6the mathematical expectation, 2F1(α, β; γ; z) denotes the Gauss hypergeometric function [33,
eq. (9.10)], and γ(a, x) denotes the lower incomplete gamma function [33, eq. (8.35.1)]. Γ(x)
denotes the gamma function [33, eq. (8.31)], and Γ(a, x) denotes the upper incomplete gamma
function [33, eq. (8.35.2)]. b(x,Rc) denotes a circle with radius Rc centered at x.
II. SYSTEM MODEL AND ASSUMPTIONS
We consider the secure transmission in a downlink multi-cell cellular network working in
TDD mode with universal frequency reuse, where there are multiple BSs each with Nt antennas,
multiple single-antenna CUs, and multiple single-antenna eavesdroppers. The downlink trans-
missions to active CUs would be wiretapped by potential eavesdroppers which do not collude.
To serve a CU, the BS transmits Gaussian distributed AN concurrently with the confidential
information. In particular, AN is transmitted spatial-uniformly in the null-space of the estimated
legitimate channel from the BS to the CU [3]. Obviously, the AN transmitted from one BS
would be an additional interference for CUs in other cells, especially for its neighbours.
A. Cellular deployment
As mentioned above, we take a cell-specific perspective and concentrate on analyzing the
average secrecy performance of a target cell, whose shape is fixed and known. In particular, we
adopt a so-called hybrid stochastic model following a stochastic geometry framework to model
the deployment of the cellular network, which is depicted in Fig. 1. In this model, a target cell
of fixed size is modeled as a circle with radius Rc centered at the origin, which is the location
of the target serving BS. The locations of other BSs in the network outside the target cell are
modeled as a PPP ΦB with density λB. For the CUs in the target cell, the interferences from
other BSs form a shot-noise process [34]. The shape of interfering cells is determined by the
association policy. Here, the CUs outside the target cell is served by the nearest BS outside the
target cell, which implies that the interfering cell area forms a Voronoi tessellation [30].
Remark: Such a model for a multi-cell cellular network was inspired by [26]. This model
applies to the scenario where the performance achieved in some given region is of significant
interest to the cellular designers. The reasonability and accuracy of the hybrid model has been
well addressed in [26]. Using a similar hybrid model, the downlink spectral efficiency of the
distributed antenna system has been analyzed in [28].
7The CUs outside the target cell are distributed as an independent PPP denoted as ΦU, whose
intensity is λU, respectively. Time division multiple access (TDMA) is adopted as the multiple
access scheme, such that the intra-cell interference is eliminated completely but the inter-cell
interference dominates the network performance. Finally, we model the positions of potential
eavesdroppers as an independent PPP ΦE with intensity λE.
With the above network deployment and association policy, there might be some BSs that
do not have any CU to serve, i.e., no CU locates in their Voronoi cells, and such BSs will
not transmit any signal (i.e., inactive). Therefore, a BS is active if and only if at least one
active CU lies in its Voronoi cell. We should first characterize the distribution of active BSs.
According to [30], the probability density function of the normalized size of a target Voronoi
cell can be approximated as fX(x) = 3.5
3.5
Γ(3.5)
x2.5e−3.5x, where X is a random variable that denotes
the size of the Voronoi cell normalized by 1/λB. It is not difficult to get the expectation of X
as E(X) = 1. Therefore, we can approximate the average area of the Voronoi cell as 1/λB.
Then, the spatial distribution of the active BSs outside the target cell can be approximated by an
independent thinning of ΦB with probability of the non-zero-user event in the cell2, i.e., a PPP ΦˆB
with intensity λˆB ≈
(
1− exp
(
−λU
λB
))
λB. On the other hand, due to the one-to-one association
between active BSs and CUs, the active CUs outside the target cell can be approximated as a
PPP ΦˆU with intensity λˆB as well. Our goal is to analyze the impact of AN transmission in such
a network on the secrecy performances of a CU in the target cell.
B. Channel model
We consider both large- and small-scale fading for the wireless channels. For large-scale
fading, we adopt the standard path loss model l(r) = d−α, where d denotes the distance and
α > 2 is the fading exponent [24]. For small-scale fading, we assume independent quasi-static
Rayleigh fading. Since the eavesdroppers are passive wiretappers, their instantaneous CSI and
locations are unavailable. Nevertheless, we assume that their small-scale channel distributions
are available, which are Rayleigh fading with unit variance.
2Although the process of the active BSs is an dependent thinning of the initial BS process ΦB. But, for mathematical tractability,
just as [31], [32], we assume that it is an independent thinning of the initial BS process with the thinning probability (in an
average sense). The approximation accuracy has been validated by the simulation results given in [31].
8C. Pilot contamination
In TDD, with channel reciprocity, the uplink training can provide the BSs with uplink as well
as downlink channel estimates [23]. However, a new problem emerges, i.e., “pilot contamination”.
Since non-orthogonal pilots should be utilized among the cells with universal frequency reuse,
the inter-cell interference causes pilot contamination, which would result in an imperfect CSI
estimation.
Under our hybrid model, we now characterize the impact of pilot contamination on the CSI
estimation for CUs in the target cell. A communication begins with the training phase when all
the CUs in each cell transmit pilot sequences to their serving BSs. Without loss of generality, we
assume that a target CU locates at a distance r from the target BS. Let
√
τa ∈ Cτ×1 denote the
pilot sequence of length τ transmitted by the CU in each cell during the training phase, where
aHa = 1. The training signal received at the BS in the target cell, Ypilot ∈ Cτ×Nt , is given by:
Ypilot =
√
Pττr
−α
2 ahTo +
∑
x∈ΦˆU
√
Pττag
T
x d
−α
2
x +Nτ , (1)
where Pτ is the pilot power, ho ∼ CN (0, INt) is the small-scale channel vector from the target
BS at origin to its served CU, gx ∼ CN (0Nt , INt) is the small-scale channel vector from the
CU at x to the target BS with distance dx away, and Nτ is a Gaussian noise matrix having zero
mean and variance N0 elements.
Assuming MMSE channel estimation [36], the estimate of ho given Ypilot is obtained as
follows:
hˆTo =
√
Pττr−αa
H

N0INt + PττaEho ,gx,ΦˆU

hohHo r−α + ∑
x∈ΦˆU/b(o,Rc)
gxg
H
x d
−α
x

 aH

−1Ypilot
=
√
Pττr−α
N0 + Pττr−α + PττEΦˆU
(∑
x∈ΦˆU/b(o,Rc)
d−αx
)aHYpilot. (2)
According to Compbell’s Theorem [41], we have
EΦˆU

 ∑
x∈ΦˆU/b(o,Rc)
d−αUx

 = λˆB ∫ +∞
Rc
1
yα
dy =
λˆBR
1−α
c
α− 1 . (3)
By the property of MMSE estimation [36], we can express the channel as ho = hˆo + e,
where the estimate hˆo and the estimation error e ∈ C1×Nt are mutually independent with hˆo ∼
9CN (0TNt , δ2INt) and e ∼ CN (0TNt , (1− δ2)INt), where
δ2 ,
Pττr
−α
N0 + Pττ
λˆBR
1−α
c
α−1
+ Pττr−α
. (4)
D. Performance metric
To evaluate the achievable performances of the CUs in the target cell, we adopt outage
constrained performance metrics, which are applicable for delay-sensitive applications, such as
those involving voice or video data communications.
For fighting against eavesdropping, each BS adopts Wyner coding [1] to encode the confidential
information. We denote the confidential message rate as Rs and the rate of the transmitted
codeword as Rt,s. Then, the rate redundancy Re = Rt,s −Rs reflects the cost for protecting the
confidential message from wiretapping [1], [6], [37]. If the channel capacity CB from the BS
to its intended CU is below Rt,s, a connection outage event occurs, and the event probability is
defined as connection outage probability pco,s, which is given by
pco,s , Pr {CB ≤ Rt,s} . (5)
Accordingly, wiretapped by k non-colluding eavesdroppers, if the maximal channel capacity
from the BS to k eavesdroppers is above the rate Re, a secrecy outage event occur, and the
event probability is defined as secrecy outage probability pso, which is given by
pso , Pr
{
max
k
CEk > Re
}
, (6)
where CEk denotes the channel capacity of the kth eavesdropper in ΦE. Under a given connection
outage constraint σ and secrecy outage constraint ǫ, the secrecy throughput µ is defined as
µ , (1− σ)Rs. (7)
III. CONNECTION AND SECRECY OUTAGE ANALYSIS
In this section, we provide connection outage and secrecy outage analysis of a CU in the target
cell affected by the AN assisted secure transmission scheme. Here, we first take a location-specific
perspective, where we focus on one CU in the target cell with a distance r from the BS. In
Section IV, we will go a step further, and analyze the achievable average secrecy throughput of
a CU in the target cell by considering the random distribution of CUs and user scheduling.
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Assume that the total transmit power of each BS is Ptot. The signal vector xz transmitted by
a BS at location z is in the form of
xz =
√
PSwzsz +
√
PA
Nt − 1Uznaz , (8)
where PS = φPtot is the power to transmit the confidential signal and PA = (1− φ)Ptot is utilized
to transmit AN with φ the power split factor, wz = hˆz||hˆz ||F is the maximum ratio transmission
(MRT) precoding vector with hˆz the estimate of channel hz from BS at location z to the target
CU, and Uz is a projection matrix onto the null-space of hˆz, i.e., hˆHz Uz = 0. We note that the
columns of [wz,Uz] constitute an orthogonal basis.
With the transmission strategy described above, the received signal yU of the target CU is
given by
yU =
√
PSr
−α
2 ||hˆo||Fso +
√
PSr
−α
2 eHwoso︸ ︷︷ ︸
CSI estimation error
+
√
PA
Nt − 1r
−α
2 eHUonao︸ ︷︷ ︸
AN Leakage
+ Z+ nu, (9)
where Z denotes the aggregated interference from BSs outside the target cell as follows
Z =
∑
z∈ΦˆB/b(0,Rc)
(√
PSf
H
z wzsz +
√
PA
Nt − 1 f
H
z Uznaz
)
D
−α
2
z
︸ ︷︷ ︸
,
with fz ∼ CN (0, INt) the channel vector and Dz the distance from the interfering BS at z to
the target CU, respectively, and nu ∼ CN (0, N0) is the Gaussian noise at the CU.
Similarly, the received signals ye of the eavesdropper at e ∈ ΦE is given by
ye =
√
PSD
−α
2
eo g
H
eowoso +
√
PA
Nt − 1D
−α
2
eo g
H
eoUonao + ne
+
∑
z∈ΦˆB/b(0,Rc)
(√
PSg
H
ezwzsz +
√
PA
Nt − 1g
H
ezUznaz
)
D
−α
2
ez , (10)
where gez ∼ CN (0, INt) and Dez are the channel vector and distance between the BS at z and the
eavesdropper at e, respectively, and ne ∼ CN (0, σ2E) is the Gaussian noise at the eavesdropper.
A. Connection Outage Analysis
We assume that the target CU can obtain the effective channel ||hˆo|| for detection via dedicated
training [36]. With only ||hˆo|| at the target CU, we consider the worst case where both the CSI
estimate error and the AN leakage are modeled as independent Gaussian noise [36]. Defining the
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SINR thresholds for the connection outage of the target CU as βBs , 2Rt,s − 1, the connection
outage probability of the target CU at a distance r from the target BS can be calculated from
(9) as follows
pco,s(r) , Pr

 PS||hˆo||2F r−α
E
(
|eHwo|2 PSr−α + ||eHUo||2F PANt−1r−α
)
+ Iout +N0
≤ βBs

 , (11)
where the aggregated interference power from the outside BSs is given by
Iout ,
∑
z∈ΦˆB/b(0,Rc)
(
PS|fHz wz|2 +
PA
Nt − 1 ||f
H
z Uz||2F
)
D−αz .
Before giving the theoretical results of pco,s(r), we first introduce the following lemma.
Defining Pz , PS|fHz wz|2 + PANt−1 ||fHz Uz||2F , we have:
Lemma 1: If PS = PANt−1 , Pz is Gamma distributed with shape parameter Nt and scale
parameter PS, i.e., Pz ∼ Gamma(Nt, PS).
If PS 6= PANt−1 , then the probability density function (pdf) of Pz is
fPz(x) =
(
1− PA
(Nt−1)PS
)1−Nt
PSΓ(Nt − 1) exp
(
− x
PS
)
γ
(
Nt − 1,
(
Nt − 1
PA
− 1
PS
)
x
)
. (12)
Proof: The proof is given in Appendix A.
According to the proof of Lemma 1, since wo and Uo are both independent of e, we have∣∣eHwo∣∣2 ∼ exp(1− δ2), and ||eHUo||2F ∼ Gamma(Nt − 1, 1− δ2) and therefore
E
(∣∣eHwo∣∣2 PSr−α + ||eHUo||2F PANt − 1r−α
)
= E
(∣∣eHwo∣∣2 Ptotr−α) = (1− δ2)Ptotr−α. (13)
Then (11) can be re-written as
pco,s(r) , Pr
(
||hˆo||2F ≤ δ2µs(PI + Iout)
)
, (14)
where µs , βBsr
α
PSδ2
and PI , (1− δ2)Ptotr−α +N0.
From (14), the critical step to evaluate pco,s(r) lies in providing a tractable form of Iout, which
is unfortunately difficult due to the asymmetry of interference region to the target CU. From
Fig. 1, we can find that for the target CU, the interfering region is asymmetric since the distance
to the closet edge of the cell is Rc − r while to the furthest edge is Rc + r. The asymmetric
property renders the exact result of pco,i(r) difficult to obtain. To avoid the dependence on the
location, we employ the “small ball” approximation illustrated by Fig. 1 to get a safe approximate
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[26]. In particular, we consider a reduced interference-exclusive region, which is a ball of radius
Ru , Rc − r with target CU at the center. The aggregate interference from BSs outside the
interference-exclusive region assuming they are PPP distributed over the whole region outside
the dash circle is an upper bound of the inter-cell interference received at the target CU. With such
an approximation, a conservative secrecy performance can be obtained, and such an approximate
performance analysis method has also been adopted in [26]. The approximate theoretical results
are given by the following theorem.
Theorem 1: Denoting Iˆout ,
∑
z∈ΦˆB/b(0,Ru)
PzD
−α
z , a safe approximate pco,s is given by
pco,s(r) / pˆco,s = 1− exp (−µsPI)
Nt−1∑
k=0
k∑
p=0
(µsPI)
k−p xp,s
(k − p)! , (15)
where x0,s , LIˆout(µs), xp,s ,
∑Nt−1
m=1
Qm(p+1,1)
m!
LIˆout(µs),
Q ,


0,
Ψ1, 0
Ψ2, Ψ1, 0
.
.
.
.
.
.
ΨNt−1, ΨNt−2 · · · Ψ1 0

 ,
Ψm ,

 µ
m
s
(
2πλˆB
(
1−
PA
(Nt−1)PS
)1−Nt
PS
Υm
)
, if PS 6= PANt−1
µms 2πλˆBΘm, if PS = PANt−1
Θm ,
(
Nt+m−1
Nt−1
)
PmS (R
−α
u )
m− 2
α
2F1
(
m+Nt, m− 2α ;m− 2α + 1;−µsPSR−αu
)
α(m− 2
α
)
, (16)
Υm ,
Pm+1S R
−α(m− 2α)
u(
m− 2
α
)
α
2F1
(
m+ 1, m− 2
α
;m− 2
α
+ 1;−µsPSR−αu
)
−
Nt−2∑
i=0
(
i+m
i
)
(
Nt−1
PA
− 1
PS
)i
α

( PA
Nt − 1
)i+m+1
(R−αu )
m− 2
α
m− 2
α
2F1
(
i+m+ 1, m− 2
α
;m− 2
α
+ 1;−µsPAR
−α
u
NT − 1
)
, (17)
and LIˆout(µs) can be calculated by (18) and (19).
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1) If PS = PANt−1 ,
LIˆout(µs) = exp

λˆBπ

R2u − R2u
(PSR−αu µs + 1)
Nt
− µ
2
α
s
PNtS Γ(Nt)
(R−αu µs)
1− 2
α Γ(Nt + 1)(
1− 2
α
) (
R−αu µs +
1
PS
)Nt+1
2F1
(
1, Nt + 1, 2− 2
α
,
R−αu µs
R−αu µs +
1
PS
)))
(18)
2) If PS 6= PANt−1 ,
LIˆout(µs) = exp

−λˆBπ γ(δ +Nt)
PSγ(Nt)
(
Nt−1
PA
)δ+1 2F1
(
1, Nt + δ;Nt; 1− PA
(Nt − 1)PS
)
Γ(1− δ)µδs + T (µs)

 .
(19)
where
T (µs) , πλˆBR2u −
2πλˆB
(
1− PA
(Nt−1)PS
)1−Nt
αPS
(
R2+αu
µs
(
1 + 2
α
)2F1(1, 1 + 2
α
; 2 +
2
α
;− 1
PSµsR−αu
)
−
Nt−2∑
i=0
(
1− PA
(Nt−1)PS
)i
Nt−1
PA
R2+αi+αu(
PAµs
Nt−1
)i+1 (
i+ 1 + 2
α
)2F1
(
i+ 1, i+ 1 +
2
α
; i+ 2 +
2
α
;− Nt − 1
PAµsR−αu
)
.
(20)
Proof: The proof is given in Appendix B.
The analytical result of the approximation given in Theorem 1 is rather unwieldy. With Alzer’s
inequality [39], we next provide a tight lower bound of pˆco,i, which can simplify the theoretical
calculation of the connection outage.
Theorem 2: Denoting κ = (Nt!)−
1
Nt , pˆco,s(r) is tightly lower bounded by
pˆco,s(r) ≥ pˆLco,s(r) = 1 +
Nt∑
k=1
(−1)k
(
Nt
k
)
exp (−kκµsPI)LIˆout(kκµs). (21)
Proof: The proof is given in Appendix C.
The analysis result of the connection outage in Theorem 1 and its lower bound in Theorem 2
are validated in Fig. 2. For all the simulations in this paper, 100, 000 trials are used. From the
simulation results in Fig. 2, we can observe that the “small ball” approximation is sufficiently
accurate and the simulation result almost overlaps with the analytical expression (15) in Theorem
1. Furthermore, the lower bound is tight, especially for the low connection outage region.
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Fig. 3. pˆco,s versus λB for βB = 10 dB, r = 50 m, Rc = 200, λU = 10λB, τ = Nt, Nt = 3, Pτ = 20dBm, α = 3, Ptot =
30dBm, φ = 0.5, and N0 = −70 dBm.
In the following, we analyze the effect of the key system parameters on the connection outage
probability. From the model as illustrated in Fig. 1, we know that the out-cell interference
increases with the increasing λB and the decreasing Rc. Therefore, we can infer that the CU’s
connection outage probability would increases with the increasing λB and decreasing Rc. The
effect of λB on the CU’s connection outage probability can also be found from the analysis
result given in (15). Assuming taht PI = 0, pˆco,s would degrade into
pˆco,s = 1−
Nt−1∑
p=0
xp,s.
Since Ψm is an increasing function of λB, we can infer that pˆco,s is a decreasing function of
λB. Pτ and τ determine the channel estimation quality, i.e., PI in (15). Therefore, obviously,
the CU’s connection outage probability would increases with the decreasing Pτ and τ . The
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simulation results in Fig. 3 show the change trend of the CU’s connection outage probability
versus λB for different Rc. From the simulation results in Fig. 3, we can find that the CU’s
connection outage probability increases with the increasing λB and the decreasing Rc, which
has validated the above analysis.
B. Secrecy Outage Analysis
In this subsection, we characterize the secrecy outage probability pso of a target CU. Since
the noise power at each eavesdropper is unknown, just as [6], [14], [15], [17], considering the
worst-case, we set it to be zero, i.e., σ2E = 0. Furthermore, in order to achieve the maximum level
of secrecy, we assume that eavesdroppers are capable of performing multiuser decoding (e.g.,
successive interference cancellation) and the concurrent transmissions of information signals in
other cells would not degrade the quality of reception at eavesdroppers [17]. Then the wiretapping
is only disturbed by the AN, and thus the achievable SIR at an eavesdropper at e ∈ ΦE can be
calculated as
SIREe =
PS|gHeowo|2D−αeo
PA
Nt−1
||gHeoUo||2FD−αeo +
∑
z∈ΦˆB/b(0,Rc)
PA
Nt−1
||gHezUz||2FD−αez
. (22)
Assuming that the SIR threshold for secrecy outage is defined as βE = 2Re − 1, from the
definition in (6), the secrecy outage is given by
pso = 1− Pr{maxCEe ≤ Re} = 1− EΦˆB
(
EΦE
(∏
e∈ΦE
Pr
(
SIREe < βE|ΦˆB
)))
. (23)
Unfortunately, deriving an accurate analytical expression of (23) is mathematically intractable.
Instead, we provide upper and lower bounds of (23) in the following theorem.
Theorem 3: Denoting αE , PAβE(Nt−1)PS , the upper bound p
U
so and lower bound pLso of the secrecy
outage probability are given by
pUso =1− exp
(
−2πλE (1 + αE)−Nt+1
(∫ Rc
0
exp
(
−λBs
(∫ pi
0
(Ω (l2(θ)) + Ω (l1(θ)))
))
ydy+∫ +∞
Rc
exp
(
−2λBs
(∫ ν
0
(Ξ1(θ) + Ω (l4(θ))) dθ +
∫ pi
ν
Ξ2(θ)dθ
))
ydy
))
, (24)
pLso = (1 + αE)
−Nt+1
(∫ Rc
0
2πλEye
−piλEy
2
exp
(
−λBs
(∫ pi
0
(Ω (l2(θ)) + Ω (l1(θ)))
))
ydy
+
∫ +∞
Rc
2πλEye
−piλEy
2
exp
(
−2λBs
(∫ ν
0
(Ξ1(θ) + Ω (l4(θ))) dθ +
∫ pi
ν
Ξ2(θ)dθ
))
ydy
)
.
(25)
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Fig. 4. Validation of the upper bound pUso and lower bound pLso for λB = 1/(16 × 2002), Rc = 300,λU = 10λB, λE = 2λB,
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where l1(θ) ,
√
R2c − y2sin2θ + ycosθ, l2(θ) ,
√
R2c − y2sin2θ − ycosθ, l3(θ) , ycosθ −√
R2c − (ysinθ)2, l4(θ) , l3(θ) + 2
√
R2c − (ysinθ)2, ν , arsin
(
Rc
y
)
, and
Ω(x) ,− x
2
(
1− (1 + αEyαx−α)−Nt+1)+ (αEyα) 2α Γ
(
1− 2
α
)
2
Γ
(
Nt +
2
α
− 1)
Γ (Nt − 1)
−
(
PAβEy
α
2PS
)
x2−α(
Nt +
2
α
− 1) (αEyαx−α + 1)Nt 2F1
(
1, Nt;Nt +
2
α
;
1
αEyαx−α + 1
)
,
(26)
Ξ1(θ) ,
l23(θ)
2
(
1− (1 + αEyαl−α3 (θ))−Nt+1)+ l2−α3 (θ)(
Nt +
2
α
− 1) (αEyαl−α3 (θ) + 1)Nt(
PAβEy
α
2PS
)
2F1
(
1, Nt;Nt +
2
α
;
1
αEyαl
−α
3 (θ) + 1
)
, (27)
Ξ2(θ) ,
1
2
(αEy
α)
2
α Γ
(
1− 2
α
)
Γ
(
Nt +
2
α
− 1)
Γ (Nt − 1) . (28)
Proof: The proof is given in Appendix D.
Theoretical results in (24) and (25) are validated by simulation results in Fig. 4, where we
can observe that the upper bound is tight. Therefore, we will use pUso for approximating pso.
In the following, we analyze the effects of the key system parameters on the achievable secrecy
outage probability. Firstly, with the increasing λB, the network interference due to AN transmitted
from multiple active BSs would increase, and the wiretapping capability of eavesdroppers would
decrease. Therefore, we can infer that the secrecy outage probability would decrease with the
increasing λB . Secondly, as the number of antennas equipped at each BS increases, more degrees-
of-freedom can be utilized by each BS for transmitting AN. Therefore, we can infer that the
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Fig. 5. Secrecy outage probability versus λB for Rc = 300, λU = 10λB, λE = 116×3002 , τ = Nt, Pτ = 20dBm, α = 3, Ptot =
30dBm, φ = 0.5, N0 = −50 dBm.
secrecy outage probability would decrease with the increasing Nt. Finally, since the cellular
network is interference-limited, the network interference dominates the reception quality of
eavesdroppers. Therefore, we can infer that the transmit power of each BS has little or no
effect on the achievable secrecy outage probability. The simulation results in Fig. 5 show the
change trend of the secrecy outage probability versus λB for different Nt. From the simulation
results in Fig. 5, we can find that the secrecy outage probability decreases with the increasing
λB and Nt, which has validated the above analysis.
It is worth mentioning that although the network interference would increase the connection
outage probability of the target user, it also can decrease the secrecy outage probability. Therefore,
the network interference may not be harmful for the cellular communication, when considering
the communication security.
IV. AVERAGE SECRECY THROUGHPUT AND DATA THROUGHPUT ANALYSIS
The analysis results in the above section is for a target CU at a certain distance r from
the target BS. We note that the connection outage probabilities in Theorem 1 and Theorem 2
are functions of r (µs is a function of r), i.e., location dependent, while the secrecy outage
probability is independent to r. This is because a secrecy outage occurs when eavesdroppers
have a better channel than the threshold, which is irrespective to the location of the target CU.
In this section, we will analyze the average secrecy throughput achieved by each CU in the
target cell, by considering the random distribution of users and user scheduling.
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When the CUs are randomly distributed in the target cell as a PPP, they are i.i.d uniformly
distributed on the disk b(o.Rc) with radial density [43]
fr(x) =
2x
R2c
, if 0 ≤ x ≤ Rc. (29)
Then, the average connection outage probability of each scheduled CU, i.e., pNetco,s, is given by
pNetco,s =
∫ Rc
0
pˆco,s(x)
2x
R2
dx. (30)
Since TDMA is employed in the cell, each CU has an equal probability to be scheduled for
service. The following lemma gives the scheduling probability of a CU in the target cell.
Lemma 2: With PPP-distributed CUs in the target cell, the scheduling probability of a CU is
given by
PUs =
1− e−piR2cλU
πR2cλU
. (31)
Proof: The proof is given in Appendix E.
We now analyze the secrecy throughput achieved by a randomly chosen CU in the target
cell. As we mentioned in Section III-B, the upper bound pUso in (24) for the secrecy outage is
tight, which is adopted here to approximate the secrecy outage probability. From (7), the secrecy
rate Rs should be calculated from Rs = Rt,s − Re. Therefore, the maximal SINR threshold for
satisfying the connection outage constraint, βBs , and the minimal SIR threshold for satisfying
the secrecy outage constraint, βE, should be obtained under the reliability constraint pNetco,s ≤ σ
and security constraint pUso ≤ ǫ. Although their analytical results are difficult to get, from (30)
and (24), we find that their numerical results can be obtained by numerical approaches, e.g.,
bisection search, since pNetco,s , and pUso are both monotonically increasing functions of βBs and βE,
respectively.
With the obtained numerical results of βBs and βE, the maximal secrecy rate Rt,s and the
minimal rate redundancy Re can be calculated as Rt,s = log2 (1 + βBs) and Re = log2(1 + βE),
respectively. Then, taking random scheduling into consideration, the maximal secrecy throughput
achieved by a randomly chosen CU can be calculated from (7), which is given by
µ = PUS (1− σ) (log2 (1 + βBs)− log2(1 + βE)) . (32)
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Fig. 6. The achievable average secrecy throughput versus the power allocation coefficient, φ, between AN and confidential
message for different λB. The system parameters are Rc = 300 m, Pτ = 30dBm, λU = 10λB, τ = Nt = 4, λE = λB/10,
N0 = −50 dBm, the connection outage constraint σ = 0.1, secrecy outage constraint ǫ = 0.01, and Ptot = 30dBm.
V. SIMULATION RESULTS
In this section, we provide numerical results to illustrate the effects of different system param-
eters on the secrecy performances of the cellular network, i.e., the average secrecy throughput
of per CU in the network.
A. Effect of AN power allocation
In Fig. 6, we plot the achievable average secrecy throughput (32) versus the power split factor φ
to show the effect of AN power allocation on the achievable secrecy performance. As we know, as
φ increases, the power allocated to the AN decreases and the power allocated to the confidential
signals increases. With the increasing power of the AN, both the wiretapping capability of
eavesdroppers and the reception quality of the intended CU would decrease. Accordingly, with
the increasing power of the confidential signals, both the wiretapping capability of eavesdroppers
and the reception quality of the intended CU would increase. Therefore, we can infer that
there is an optimal tradeoff between deteriorating the eavesdroppers’ wiretapping capability and
improving the intended CU’s reception quality. This has been validated by the simulation results
in Fig. 6. We can find that the achievable average secrecy throughput first increases and then
decreases with the increasing φ, which shows that AN is helpful for improving the security of
the cellular network. But it is important to optimize the power allocation to obtain a preferable
secrecy performance.
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Fig. 7. The achievable average secrecy throughput versus the pilot power Pτ . The system parameters are Rc = 300 m, φ = 0.5
α = 3, λU = 10λB, τ = Nt = 4, λE = λB/10, N0 = −50 dBm, the connection outage constraint σ = 0.1, secrecy outage
constraint ǫ = 0.01, and PS = 15dBm, PA = 15 dBm.
From above, we can conclude that AN transmission provides a substantial secrecy improvement
to CUs, which is a promising secrecy scheme for a cellular network.
B. Effect of pilot contamination
In Fig. 7, we plot the achievable secrecy throughput versus the pilot power Pτ for different
λB. From (4), we know that the CSI estimation quality improves with an increasing Pτ , which
improves the secrecy throughput. Furthermore, the effect of the pilot contamination is also vali-
dated in Fig. 7. The average secrecy throughput per CU decreases with an increasing λB since the
effect of the pilot contamination increases as λB increases. In addition, the secrecy performance
gaps between different λB’s increase with an increasing Pτ . This can be explained by the fact that
when Pτ is small, the thermal noise at the target BS dominates the cochannel pilot interference
during the uplink training from CUs outside the target cell. Therefore, the performance gaps
between different λB’s is small. However, when Pτ is large, the pilot contamination interference
becomes dominated. When Pτ increases, the interference power causing pilot contamination
increases with the increasing λB and the performance gaps between different λB’s get larger.
C. Effect of number of antennas at BSs
In Fig. 8, we plot the achievable average secrecy throughput versus the number of antennas
equipped at each BS (Nt) to show the secrecy performance gains brought by an increasing Nt.
With an increasing Nt, the strength of confidential signals would increase due to an increasing
diversity gain. Furthermore, AN would interfere with the potential eavesdroppers more efficiently
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Fig. 8. The achievable average secrecy throughput versus the number of antennas equipped at each BS for different λB’s. The
system parameters are Rc = 300 m, Pτ = 30dBm, λUs = 10λB, τ = Nt, λE = λB/10, N0 = −50 dBm,, the connection
outage constraint σ = 0.1, secrecy outage constraint ǫ = 0.01, Ptot = 30dBm, and φ = 0.3.
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Fig. 9. The achievable average secrecy throughput of the CU at the edge of the target cell versus the intensity of BSs. The
system parameters are Rc = 100 m, α = 3, λU = 10λB, τ = Nt = 3, Pτ = 30dBm, N0 = −50 dBm, λE = λB10 , the connection
outage constraint σ = 0.1, secrecy outage constraint ǫ = 0.01, and φ = 0.3.
due to an increasing degree-of-freedom. As expected, we can find that the achievable average
secrecy throughput increases monotonically. It is also shown that the achievable average secrecy
throughput decreases with an increasing λB. This result can be explained by the fact that the
harmful interference received at CUs increases with an increasing λB.
D. Secrecy performance of the CU at the cell edge
In the above simulation results, we have investigated the average secrecy performance achieved
by a randomly chosen CU in the target cell. But, the secrecy performance of the CU at the cell
edge is unknown. As we known, the power of the inter-cell interference received by the CU at
the cell edge is larger than any other CUs in the target cell. Therefore, the secrecy performance
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of the CU at the cell edge represents the worst-case secrecy performance of the target cell, which
should be studied separately.
Fig. 9 gives the simulation results of the secrecy throughput achieved by the CU at the edge
of the target cell versus the intensity of BSs. With the increasing intensity of BSs, the inter-
cell interference power received by the CU at the cell edge would increase and the receive
performance of the CU would be deteriorated. This has been validated by the simulation results
in Fig. 9. From Fig. 9, we can find that the achievable secrecy throughput decreases with the
increasing λB. Furthermore, from Fig. 9, we can find that the achievable secrecy throughput
increases with the increasing Ptot. This can be explained by the following facts. Although the
inter-cell interference power increases with the increasing Ptot, the power of the confidential
signals received at the CU would also increases. When the received SNR at the CU is not large
enough, the increasing power of the confidential signals would improve the secrecy performance
of the CU.
VI. CONCLUSION
From a network perspective, we analyzed the effect of AN on the secrecy performance
of CUs in a randomly deployed cellular network. Based on a hybrid model, we took into
account pilot contamination, and derived the analytical average connection outage and the secrecy
outage of a CU. These results facilitate efficient numerical evaluations of the average secrecy
throughput. From the numerical results, we find that for a CU, AN is a promising solution to
enhance secrecy in a cellular network. However, there is an optimal tradeoff between jamming
eavesdroppers and improving the receiving performance of CUs. Therefore, for maximizing the
secrecy performance, the power allocated to AN should be optimized carefully.
APPENDIX A
PROOF OF LEMMA 1
Since the matrix [wz,Uz] is unitary and the elements of fz are independent complex Gaussian
distributed with zero mean and unit variance, ||fHz Uz||2F ∼ Gamma(Nt − 1, 1) and |fHz wz|2 ∼
exp(1). Therefore, when PS = PANt−1 , Pz ∼ Gamma(Nt, PS).
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When PS 6= PANt−1 , the pdf of Pz, i.e., fPz can be calculated as
fPz(x) =
∫ x
0
1
PS
exp
(
−x− y
PS
)
yNt−2e
−
y(Nt−1)
PA(
PA
Nt−1
)Nt−1
Γ(Nt − 1)
dy
=
(
1− PA
(Nt−1)PS
)1−Nt
PSΓ(Nt − 1) γ
(
Nt − 1,
(
Nt − 1
PA
− 1
PS
)
x
)
exp
(
− x
PS
)
. (33)
APPENDIX B
PROOF OF THEOREM 1
From (14), since hˆo ∼ CN (0, δ2INt), ||hˆo||2F ∼ Gamma(Nt, δ2) and its cumulative distribution
function (CDF) is given by
Pr
(
||hˆo||2F ≤ z
)
= 1−
Nt−1∑
k=0
( z
δ2
)k 1
k!
exp
(
− z
δ2
)
. (34)
Defining xp,s , (−1)
pµps
p!
dpL
Iˆout(µs)
dpµs
, we have
pˆco,s = 1−
Nt−1∑
k=1
exp (−µsPI)
k∑
p=0
(µsPI)
k−p xp,s
(k − p)! . (35)
In the following, we concentrate on deriving the closed-form result of xp,s. Using the proba-
bility generating functional (PGFL) [41], the Laplace transform LIˆout(µs) can be derived as
LIˆout(µs) = EΦˆB

 ∏
zs∈ΦˆB/b(o,Ru)
EPzsexp
(−µsPzsD−αzs )

 = exp(−2πλˆB ∫ +∞
Ru
(1− ws(r)) rdr
)
,
(36)
where ws(r) , EPz (exp (−µsPzr−α)).
The pdf of Pz has been given in Lemma 1. For brevity, we only consider the case PS 6= PANt−1 ,
and the analysis result of ws(r) for the case PS = PANt−1 , can be obtained by a similar way.
ws(r) =
(
1− PA
(Nt−1)PS
)1−Nt
PS

 PS
1 + PSµsr−α
−
Nt−2∑
i=0
(
Nt−1
PA
− 1
PS
)i
(
Nt−1
PA
+ µsr−α
)i+1

 . (37)
Then, with (36), we have
dLIˆout(µs)
dµs
=
(
2πλˆB
∫ +∞
Ru
dws(r)
dµs
rdr+
)
LIˆout(µs) = LIˆout(µs)g (µs) (38)
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where
g (µs) , 2πλˆB
(
1− PA
(Nt−1)PS
)1−Nt
PS
∫ +∞
Ru
−P 2S r−α
(1 + PSµsr−α)
2 −
Nt−2∑
i=0
(
Nt−1
PA
− 1
PS
)i
(i+ 1) (−r−α)(
Nt−1
PA
+ µsr−α
)i+2 rdr.
(39)
Then, applying the Leibniz formula, we have
xp,s =
(−1)p µps
p!
p−1∑
m=1
(
p− 1
m
)
dp−1−mg (µs)
dp−1−mµs
m!
(−1)m µms
xm,s =
p−1∑
m=1
p−m
p
Ψp−mxm,s, (40)
where
Ψp−m ,µp−ms

2πλˆB
(
1− PA
(Nt−1)PS
)1−Nt
PS
∫ +∞
Ru

 PS (PSr−α)p−m
(1 + PSµsr−α)
p−m+1 −
Nt−2∑
i=0
(
i+ p−m
i
) (Nt−1
PA
− 1
PS
)i
(r−α)
p−m(
Nt−1
PA
+ µsr−α
)i+p−m+1

 rdr
︸ ︷︷ ︸
I1

 .
(41)
Then, employing [33, eq. (3.194.1)], the integral form I1 can be derived as I1 = Υp−m in (17) .
Since the linear recurrence relation of xp,s in (40) has a similar form as [42, eq. (37)], we can
obtain the explicit form of xp,s with a similar procedure in [42] which is given by
xp,s =
Nt−1∑
m=1
Qm(p+ 1, 1)
m!
LIˆout. (42)
LIˆout can be derived as follows
LIˆout
(b)
= exp
(
−2πλˆB
(∫ +∞
0
(1− ws(r)) rdr −
∫ Ru
0
(1− ws(r)) rdr
))
(c)
= exp
(
−λˆBπE
(
P δzs
)
Γ(1− δ)µδs
)
exp

2πλˆB
∫ Ru
0
(1− ws(r))︸ ︷︷ ︸
I2

 rdr (43)
Step (b) follows from the probability generating functional (PGFL) of a PPP. Step (c) is due to
[33, eq. (3.194.2)] and [41, eq. (8)].
With the pdf of Pzs in (12) and [33, eq. (6.455.2)], E
(
P δzs
)
in (43) can be derived as
E
(
P δzs
)
=
γ(δ +Nt)
PSγ(Nt)
(
Nt−1
PA
)δ+1 2F1
(
1, Nt + δ;Nt; 1− PA
(Nt− 1)PS
)
(44)
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Using the variable substitution: z = r−α, the integral term I2 in (43) can be derived as
I2 = πλˆBR
2
u −
2πλˆB
(
1− PA
(Nt−1)PS
)1−Nt
αPS
∫ +∞
R−αu

 PSz− 2α−1
1 + psµsz
−
Nt−2∑
i=0
(
1− PA
PS(Nt−1)
)i
Nt−1
PA
z−
2
α
−1
1 + PAµsz
Nt−1

 dz
(45)
With [33, eq. (3.194.2)], I2 can be further derived as T (µi) in (20).
APPENDIX C
PROOF OF THEOREM 2
To prove Theorem 2, we need the following lemma,
Lemma 3 (Alzer’s inequality [39]): If x ∼ Gamma(N, 1) , then the CDF Fx(y) = Pr (x ≤ y)
is tightly lower bounded by (1− e−κy)N / Fx(y), where Fx(y) =
∫ y
0
e−xxN−1
(N−1)!
dx and κ =
(N !)−
1
N
.
Since ||hˆB||2F ∼ Gamma(Nt, δ2), according to Alzer’s inequality [39], the tight lower bound
of pˆco,i for i = s, c are given as follows
pˆco,i '
(
1− exp
(
−κµi
(
PI + Iˆout
)))Nt
. (46)
Using the binomial expansion, the proof can be completed.
APPENDIX D
PROOF OF THEOREM 3
In the following proof, we set χe , gHeowowHo geo, and ωez , gHezUzUHz gez, z ∈ ΦE ∪
{o}. Since gez is independent of wz and Uz, we can conclude that χe ∼ exp(1) and ωez ∼
Gamma (Nt − 1, 1).
A. Upper Bound
We first show the derivation of the upper bound pUso as follows
pso = 1− EΦˆB
(
EΦE
(∏
e∈ΦE
Pr
(
SIREe ≤ βE|ΦˆB
)))
= 1− EΦˆB
(
exp
(
−2πλE
∫ +∞
0
Pr
(
PSχey
−α
PA
Nt−1
ωeoy−α +
∑
z∈ΦˆB/b(0,Rc)
PA
Nt−1
ωezD−αez
≥ βE
)
ydy|ΦˆB
))
(f)
≤ pUso , 1− exp
(
−2πλE
∫ +∞
0
EΦˆB
(
Pr
(
SIREe ≥ βE|ΦˆB
))
ydy
)
(g)
= 1− exp

−2πλE (1 + αE)−Nt+1 ∫ +∞
0
EΦˆB

exp

 ∑
z∈ΦˆB/b(o,Rc)
f(ωez, y, Dez)



 ydy

 .
(47)
26
where αE , PAβE(Nt−1)PS , f(ωez, y, Dez) , −αEωezyαD−αez , step (f) is due to Jensen’s inequality,
and step (g) is due to the Laplace transform of the gamma variable.
The difficulty of further derivation lies in the integral of
∫ +∞
0
EΦˆB
(exp (
∑
z f(ωez, y, Dez))) ydy.
This is because when y < Rc (eavesdroppers in the target cell) and y > Rc (eavesdroppers outside
the target cell), the function EΦˆB (exp (
∑
z f(ωez, y, Dez))) has different expressions due to the
different shapes of the interference region from ΦˆB, i.e., we have∫ +∞
0
EΦˆB
[
exp
(∑
z
f(ωez, y, Dez)
)]
ydy =
∫ Rc
0
E
[
exp
(∑
z
f(ωez, y, Dez)
)
|y ≤ Rc
]
︸ ︷︷ ︸
T1
ydy +
∫ +∞
Rc
E
[
exp
(∑
z
f(ωez, y, Dez)
)
|y > Rc
]
︸ ︷︷ ︸
T2
ydy.
(48)
In Fig. 10, we show these two cases. In the following, we derive the analytical results of T1
and T2.
1. The analytical result of T1.
Fig. 10 (a) shows the case that eavesdroppers are in the target cell, where we have l1(θ) =√
R2c − y2sin2θ + ycosθ and l2(θ) =
√
R2c − y2sin2θ − ycosθ. Then, we have
T1 = exp
(
−λB
(∫ pi
0
Eωez
[∫ +∞
l2(θ)
(1− exp (f(ωez, y, x))) xdx
+
∫ +∞
l1(θ)
(1− exp (f(ωez, y, x)))xdx
]
dθ
))
. (49)
Then invoking [40, eq. (28)], we have
Eωez
[∫ +∞
l2(θ)
(1− exp (f(ωez, y, x)))xdx
]
=− l
2
2(θ)
2
Eωez [1− exp (f(ωez, y, l2(θ)))] +
1
2
Eωez
[
(−f(ωez, y, 1))
2
α Γ
(
1− 2
α
)]
− 1
2
Eωez
[
(−f(ωez, y, 1))
2
α Γ
(
1− 2
α
,−f(ωez, y, l2(θ))
)]
(h)
=Ω(l2(θ)) (50)
where step (h) can be achieved by adopting [33, eq. (3.326.2)] and [33, eq. (6.455.1)], since
ωez ∼ Gamma (Nt − 1, 1).
The analytical result of Eωez
(∫ +∞
l1(θ)
(1− exp (f(ωez, y, x))) xdx
)
can be obtained with the
same procedures, which are omitted for brevity. Then, the analytical result of T1 can be obtained.
27
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 1
(
)
l
 
1
(
)
l
 
 
2 ( )l  
1
(
)
l
 
     Base Station,     Potential Eavesdropper 
 
(a) (b) 
  
3( )l  
4 ( )l   
Fig. 10. Illustration of the regions of interfering BSs: a) eavesdroppers are in the target cell, where the interfering BSs region
is labeled by transverse lines; b) eavesdroppers are outside the target cell, where the interfering BSs region has two parts with
one labeled by transverse lines and the other labeled by oblique lines.
2. The analytical result of T2.
Fig. 10 (b) shows the case that eavesdroppers are outside the target cell, where we have
ν = arsin
(
Rc
y
)
, l3(θ) = ycosθ −
√
R2c − (ysinθ)2, and l4(θ) = l3(θ) + 2
√
R2c − (ysinθ)2. The
interference region could be divided into two parts, as shown in Fig. 10 (b) by different type of
lines. Accordingly, T2 can be calculated as
T2 =
exp
(
−2λB
(∫ ν
0
(
Ξ1(θ) + Eωez
[∫ +∞
l4(θ)
(1− exp (f(ωez, y, x)))xdx
])
dθ +
∫ pi
ν
Ξ2(θ)dθ
))
(51)
where
Ξ1(θ) , Eωez
[∫ l3(θ)
0
(1− exp (f(ωez, y, x)))xdx
]
,
Ξ2(θ) , Eωez
[∫ +∞
0
(1− exp (f(ωez, y, x))) xdx
]
, (52)
Just as (50), we have
Eωez
(∫ +∞
l4(θ)
(1− exp (f(ωez, y, x))) xdx
)
= Ω(l4(θ)). (53)
Invoking [40, eq. (28)], the analytical results of Ξi(θ), i = 1, 2 can be derived as (27) and (28),
and the details are omitted for brevity. Then substituting Ξ1(θ) and Ξ3(θ) into (51), the analytical
result of T2 can be obtained.
Finally, substituting the analytical result of T1 and T2 into (48), the proof can be completed.
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B. Lower Bound
By considering the nearest eavesdropper only, a lower bound of secrecy outage probability can
be derived. Assuming that the eavesdropper at e∗ is the nearest eavesdropper, DEe∗ is distributed
according to the following pdf [43]:
fDEe∗ (y) = 2πλEye
−piλEy2 . (54)
The lower bound pLso can be derived as
pso ≥ pLso = EDEe∗
(
EΦˆB
(
Pr
(
SIREe ≥ z|ΦˆB, DEe∗
)))
=
(1 + αE)
−Nt+1
∫ +∞
0
2πλEye
−piλEy2E

exp

 ∑
z∈ΦˆB/b(o,Rc)
f(ωez, y, Dez)



 dy. (55)
Therefore, just as the derivation of the derivation of pUso, the key step for getting the analysis
result of pLso is getting the analysis result of E
(
exp
(∑
z∈ΦˆB/b(o,Rc)
f(ωez, y, Dez)
))
. Therefore,
following the derivation of T1 and T2, the analytical result of pLso can be obtained and the detailed
derivations are omitted for brevity.
APPENDIX E
PROOF OF LEMMA 2
Assuming that the target CU locates in the target cell in addition to the CUs PPP ΦU.
According to the Slivnyak’s theorem [41], we know that the added target CU does not affect
the spatial distribution of other CUs. Thus, the probability mass function of the number of other
CUs (denoted as Ms) is Possion distributed, i.e., Pr (Ms = m) = (piR
2
cλU)
m
m!
e−piR
2
cλU
. Then, the
scheduling probability of a target CU can be evaluated as
PU =
+∞∑
m=0
Pr (Ms = m)
m+ 1
=
1− e−piR2cλU
πR2cλU
(56)
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